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ABSTRACT 
We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the 
outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. 
While it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we 
argue that a careful examination of David Lewis's influential counterfactual semantics casts 
doubt upon this. We discuss ways in which Lewis's semantics and standard CACs might be 
extended to the case of space-like correlations.  
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1 Introduction 
A source emits a pair of entangled particles, A and B, in opposite directions. Particle A travels 
to Detector 1, B to Detector 2. The detectors measure the particles' spins along the same axis, 
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the possible values being 'up' and 'down'. The unconditional probability of A being measured 
'up' is ½, as is the probability of its being measured 'down'. Likewise for B. There is a perfect 
(anti-)correlation between the spin values: the probability of A's being spin up (down) 
conditional upon B's being spin down (up), and vice versa, is 1. Experiments like this can be 
conducted in such a way that the measurement events are space-like separated. Variants on 
this experiment can be conducted in which A and B are measured for spin along different 
axes. Provided that the axes are non-perpendicular (a qualification that we'll leave implicit in 
what follows), the spin values remain (anti-)correlated, though not perfectly so. 
Assuming orthodox quantum mechanics, the measurement results aren't 'screened off' 
(i.e., rendered probabilistically independent) from one another by the prior state of the particle 
pair together with the states of the two detectors. Since a strong case can be made that there 
can be no common cause (sufficient to explain the correlation) operating otherwise than via 
the prior state of the particle pair or the detector states, we are left with a correlation that isn't 
plausibly explained by common causes.
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Do standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the measurement 
outcomes cause one another? While some have answered in the affirmative, we shall argue 
that a careful examination of Lewis's ([1979]) influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt 
upon this. We shall then discuss ways in which Lewis's semantics and standard CACs might 
be extended to yield clear-cut verdicts about such cases. 
In more detail, the plan is as follows. Section 2 introduces the argument that standard 
CACs imply that the measurement outcomes cause one another. Section 3 argues that, when 
combined with Lewis's 'Analysis 1' (i.e., his 'asymmetry-by-fiat' analysis) of counterfactuals, 
CACs don't imply that the measurement outcomes cause one another, but rather fall silent on 
this matter. We take this to be a virtue, since it reflects the ambivalence of philosophers and 
physicists about applying our ordinary concept of cause to these cases. Section 4 argues that, 
when combined with Lewis's preferred 'Analysis 2' of counterfactuals (i.e., his 'closest worlds' 
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analysis) plus his suggested similarity metric, standard CACs yield the decisive verdict that 
there is no causation between the measurement outcomes on the two entangled particles. 
Given our intuitive indecisiveness about whether such correlations are causal, we take this as 
a defect of Analysis 2. We therefore propose a retreat to Analysis 1. Finally, Section 5 shows 
that, while the combination of standard CACs with Analysis 1 succeeds in reproducing the 
indecisiveness of ordinary intuitions about the applicability of the concept of causation to 
these cases, the ordinary concept of causation might usefully be extended to yield determinate 
results about causation between the measurement outcomes. The idea would be to forge a 
revised concept of causation that might constitute a more useful part of the physicist's 
conceptual armory: in other words, to move from 'descriptive' analysis to 'prescriptive' or 
'revisionary' analysis. Some possible revisionary analyses that take standard CACs as their 
point of departure are canvassed. 
2 Measurement Outcomes and CACs 
According to a plausible and highly influential tradition initiated by Lewis ([1973a]), 
causation is to be analyzed in terms of counterfactuals.
2
 Analyses within this tradition 
typically take counterfactual dependence between distinct, actual events to suffice for 
causation.
3
 (Event e counterfactually depends upon event c iff e wouldn't have occurred if c 
hadn't occurred.) 
While plausibly sufficient, counterfactual dependence isn't necessary for causation. 
This is because of the possibility of cases of redundant causation, such as pre-emption and 
symmetric overdetermination (see Lewis [1986b], Postscript E), and of probabilistic 
causation where, in the absence of the cause, the effect would have had some residual 
probability of occurring (see Lewis [1986b], Postscript B). It seems clear that our case doesn't 
involve redundancy. We shall have more to say about probabilistic causation shortly. 
Suppose that in fact particle A is measured spin up and particle B is measured spin 
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down. Mainstream theories of events count A's being spin up as a distinct event from B's 
being spin down because they occupy distinct regions of space-time (Lewis [1986c]), or 
because A and B are distinct objects (Kim [1976]), since they occupy distinct parts of space 
when measured. 
According to standard CACs, it is relevant to the question of whether the measurement 
outcomes cause one another whether B's being spin down counterfactually depends upon A's 
being spin up, and whether A's being spin up counterfactually depends upon B's being spin 
down. Whether these things are the case is a matter of whether (CC1) and (CC2) 
(respectively) are true: 
(CC1) If A hadn't been spin up, then B wouldn't have been spin down. 
(CC2) If B hadn't been spin down, then A wouldn't have been spin up. 
Are (CC1) and (CC2) true? In the case where the particles are measured with respect to the 
same axis, Skyrms ([1984]) suggests that, in virtue of the law-like perfect (anti-)correlation 
between the measurement outcomes, both are true. He thus concludes: 
It appears that on [standard CACs] we must say that the measurement results 
[…] caused each other, forming a rather odd, closed causal chain consisting of 
two spacelike-separated events. (p. 246) 
Butterfield ([1992a]) argues that a natural generalization of standard CACs (proposed 
by Lewis ([1986b], Postscript B)) implies that there is causation between the measurement 
outcomes even in the version of the experiment in which the measurements are conducted 
with respect to different axes, where the (anti-)correlation is less than perfect. The natural 
generalization in question is designed to accommodate probabilistic causation. Instead of 
appealing to counterfactual dependence between events, this generalized analysis appeals to 
probabilistic dependence. Whether B's being spin down probabilistically depends upon A's 
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being spin up and whether A's being spin up probabilistically depends on B's being spin down 
is a matter of whether (CC1*) and (CC2*) (respectively) are true: 
(CC1*) If A hadn't been spin up, then the chance (i.e., objective probability) 
of B's being spin down would have been lower than it actually was. 
 (CC2*) If B hadn't been spin down, then the chance of A's being spin up 
would have been lower than it actually was. 
Lewis (ibid. pp. 175-6) takes counterfactual dependence (captured by counterfactuals like 
(CC1) and (CC2)) simply to be a special case of probabilistic dependence (captured by 
counterfactuals like (CC1*) and (CC2*)). According to Lewis, (CC1) is true in the special 
case where, if A hadn't been spin up, the chance of B's being spin down would have been 
zero.
4
 Lewis (ibid., pp. 176–80) holds that probabilistic dependence in general suffices for 
causation.
5
 In the absence of redundancy, it might also be taken as necessary. Butterfield 
argues in some detail—again by appealing to the lawful (anti-)correlations between the 
measurement outcomes—that, even where A and B are measured with respect to different 
axes, (CC1*) and (CC2*) come out true, committing Lewis to superluminal causation 
between the two measurement outcomes. Butterfield ([1992a], p. 28) takes this result to 'make 
trouble' for Lewis's analysis. 
In what follows we shall focus upon the version of the experiment in which the 
particles are measured with respect to the same axis, and shall seek to cast doubt upon 
whether (CC1) and (CC2) come out true. Owing to the absence of redundancy and the 
deterministic nature of the connection in this case, standard CACs take counterfactual 
dependence to be necessary as well as sufficient for causation in this case, so doubt will 
thereby be cast upon whether standard CACs yield the result that the two measurement results 
cause one another. Though, to save space, we won't do so here, it is straightforward to 
generalize this reasoning to cast doubt upon whether (CC1*) and (CC2*) come out true in the 
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case where the particles are measured with respect to different axes, and hence to cast doubt 
on whether Lewis's probabilistic generalization of standard CACs implies that the 
measurement outcomes cause one another in this alternative version of the experiment. 
Before examining Lewis's semantics, however, we would like to point out that we are 
sympathetic to the positions of Skyrms and Butterfield at least to the extent that we agree that 
it wouldn't obviously be correct for a theory to entail that there is a causal relation between 
the measurement outcomes. There would, as Skyrms observes, be something 'odd' about such 
a causal relation. If Skyrms and Butterfield were correct in claiming that standard CACs entail 
such a causal relation, then the counterfactual analyst would have at least a prima facie 
difficulty in explaining why ordinary intuition seems to go indecisive concerning whether to 
interpret the relationship between the measurement outcomes causally. 
The counterfactual analyst of causation might retort that she doesn't need to 
accommodate the indecisiveness of ordinary intuition about such cases within her theory. 
After all, the space-like correlations of quantum physics are far removed from our everyday 
experience, and so it is perhaps no surprise that ordinary intuitions are unclear about what to 
say about such cases. 
A similar defense of his CAC was mounted by Lewis himself when discussing its 
failure to reproduce our alleged intuitive indecisiveness about whether symmetric 
overdeterminers count as causes. Lewis reasons as follows. 
When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-
too-far-fetched case, theory had better agree. If an analysis of causation does 
not deliver the common-sense answer, that is bad trouble. But when common 
sense falls into indecision or controversy, or when it is reasonable to suspect 
that far-fetched cases are being judged by false analogy to commonplace ones, 
then theory may safely say what it likes. Such cases can be left as spoils to the 
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victor, in D. M. Armstrong's phrase. We can reasonably accept as true 
whatever answer comes from the analysis that does best on the clearer cases. 
It would be still better, however, if theory itself went indecisive about the hard 
cases. If an analysis says that the answer for some hard case depends on 
underdescribed details, or on the resolution of some sort of vagueness, [Or on 
resolution of an ambiguity …] that would explain nicely why common sense 
comes out indecisive. (Lewis [1986b], p. 194; the text in square brackets is 
from Lewis's footnote that occurs at that point.) 
Like the cases of overdetermination that Lewis was concerned with, the space-like 
correlations of quantum physics seem to be cases in which common sense falls into indecision 
or controversy.
6
 Moreover, they are certainly not 'commonplace' in the sense of being objects 
of our everyday experience. So perhaps these count as 'spoils to the victor' cases: if CACs 
perform better than other analyses of causation in everyday cases, then we can reasonably 
accept their verdict about these more esoteric cases. 
Still, Lewis notes that it would be better if theory itself went indecisive in cases where 
intuition goes indecisive. According to Skyrms and Butterfield, standard CACs don't go 
indecisive about space-like correlations between measurement outcomes, but yield the firm 
result that they are genuinely causal. In the next section, we will question this claim. Indeed, 
we will argue that, as desired, standard CACs do go indecisive about such cases, at least when 
combined with an appropriate semantics for counterfactuals. The indecision, we will argue, 
reflects an ambiguity in the counterfactual semantics in question. 
3 Lewis's Analysis 1 of Counterfactuals ('Asymmetry-by-Fiat') 
3.1 Analysis 1 
In the previous section, it was observed that standard CACs take counterfactual dependence to 
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be necessary and sufficient for causation in cases like ours, where there is no redundancy and 
where the connection between putative cause and effect isn't merely probabilistic. (Recall that 
the case on which we are focusing is the one where the measurements are conducted with 
respect to the same axis, so that the (anti-)correlation between the outcomes is perfect.)  
This observation must be qualified, however, for counterfactual dependence is 
standardly taken to suffice for causation only if 'the right kind of counterfactual conditionals' 
(Lewis [2004], p. 78; cp. Lewis [1973a], pp. 565–7) are involved. The truth of backtracking 
counterfactuals—like 'If the barometer reading hadn't fallen, then the air pressure wouldn't 
have fallen earlier'—and back-then-foretracking counterfactuals—like 'If the barometer 
reading hadn't fallen, then (the air pressure wouldn't have fallen earlier and so) there wouldn't 
have been a storm'—doesn't suffice for causation. Consequently, according to standard CACs, 
the truth of (CC1) and (CC2) only implies that our space-like separated measurement 
outcomes cause one another if these counterfactuals express true foretrackers.
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Lewis ([1979]) describes an analysis of counterfactuals—his Analysis 1 ('asymmetry-
by-fiat')—which is designed to yield the truth of only the foretracking counterfactuals 
appealed to by standard CACs.
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Analysis 1. Consider a counterfactual 'If it were that P, then it would be that Q' 
where P is entirely about affairs in a stretch of time P. Consider all those 
possible worlds w such that: 
(i) P is true at w; 
(ii) w is exactly like our actual world at all times before P; 
(iii) w conforms to the actual laws of nature at all times after P; and 
(iv) during P, w differs no more from our actual world than it must to permit 
P to hold. 
The counterfactual is true iff Q holds at every such world w. (See ibid., p. 
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462) 
By evaluating a counterfactual 'If it were that P, then it would be that Q' with respect to 
worlds that match the actual world (hereafter '@') in history up to P, we ensure that the 
counterfactual comes out false if it expresses a back- or back-then-foretracker. For example, a 
counterfactual 'If the barometer reading hadn't fallen, then …' is to be evaluated with respect 
to those worlds that match @ at all times before the time at which the barometer reading fell 
in @. In such worlds, the earlier fall in atmospheric pressure occurs (but the barometer 
malfunctions), and so the storm still occurs. 
3.2 A frame-relative reading of Analysis 1 
On a natural reading, some phrases that occur in Analysis 1, such as 'w is exactly like our 
actual world at all times before P', make sense only relative to a given frame of reference. 
The result is that the verdicts of Analysis 1 depend on which reference frame one fixes upon.
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When it comes to evaluating quotidian counterfactuals (like those concerning the barometer 
and the storm), nothing turns upon this ambiguity: these counterfactuals receive the same 
truth-values in all frames. But this isn't true of counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2) which 
concern space-like separated events.
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Condition (ii) of Analysis 1 tells us that the relevant worlds w to consider in evaluating 
(CC1) are those that exactly match @ in past history up until (but not including) the time at 
which A is measured spin up. On the relativistic picture, however, different frames yield 
different pasts. While the absolute past of A's measurement is in its past relative to every 
frame, those events space-like separated from A's measurement are in its past in some frames 
but not in others. What counts as past history, and what therefore is 'held fixed' in the relevant 
worlds w, affects what counterfactuals come out true. For example, let Frame 1 be a frame in 
which the measurements of A and B are simultaneous; let Frame 2 be a frame in which the 
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measurement of B precedes that of A; and let Frame 3 be a frame in which the measurement 
of B occurs later than that of A (see Figure 1, where a and b are respectively the events of A 
and B being measured). Holding fixed the past of A's measurement relative to Frame 2 
requires holding fixed B's being spin down. It immediately follows that counterfactual (CC1) 
comes out false on Analysis 1 if the relevant past to hold fixed is the past relative to Frame 2.  
 
Figure 1 
 
 
By contrast, holding fixed the past of A's measurement relative to Frame 3 doesn't require 
holding fixed B's being spin down. Indeed, counterfactual (CC1) comes out true if we hold 
fixed the past relative to Frame 3. To see this, note that, by condition (iv) of Analysis 1, the 
non-occurrence of A's being spin up is to be brought about with minimal difference from @ at 
the time it is measured. Since A had chance ½ of being measured spin down, the minimally 
disruptive way of bringing about the non-occurrence of its being spin up is by having it be 
measured spin down.
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 By condition (iii), we are also to hold fixed the actual laws at all times 
after A's measurement in this frame. This means holding fixed the lawful (anti-)correlation 
between the spins of A and B. In a world at which A is measured spin down and this 
(anti-)correlation obtains, B is measured spin up. 
a b 
t = const. in Frame 1 
t = const. in Frame 3 
 rame 3 
t = const. in Frame 2 
Detector 1 
 
Detector 2 
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Counterfactual (CC1) also comes out true if the relevant past to hold fixed is the past 
relative to Frame 1. In this frame, A's being measured spin up is simultaneous with B's being 
measured spin down. Relative to Frame 1, past history up to (but not including) the time of 
A's measurement again doesn't include B's measurement. As was the case with Frame 3, A's 
not being spin up can be achieved by its being measured spin down. The requirement of 
minimal difference (condition (iv) of Analysis 1) dictates that the lawful (anti-)correlation 
between the spins of A and B still obtain, so that B is measured spin up.
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By the symmetry of the case, (CC2) comes out false when evaluated with respect to 
Frame 3, and true when evaluated with respect to Frame 2 and Frame 1. 
On a natural reading, there is thus an ambiguity in Analysis 1 when applied to space-
like correlations, which results from the use of phrases such as 'all times before P'. 
Consequently, the truth-values of counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2) are indeterminate on 
Analysis 1. In virtue of this indeterminacy, standard CACs founded upon Analysis 1 go 
indecisive about whether space-like correlations are to be interpreted causally. This reflects 
the indecisiveness of intuition about these cases. 
3.3 Frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 
Perhaps it is possible to resist the frame-relative construal of Analysis 1, so that its verdicts 
don't depend upon a choice of frame of reference. For example, one might read 'P' so that it 
refers not to the time that P concerns but rather to the region of space-time that P concerns. 
For simplicity, assume that the antecedent of the counterfactual in question concerns a point-
sized region of space-time.
13
 Then that the relevant worlds are 'exactly like our actual world at 
all times before P' might be taken to mean either (i) that we are required to hold fixed the 
absolute past of P or (ii) that we are required to hold fixed the complement of the absolute 
future of P, (excluding P itself), that is, not just the absolute past of P but also the absolute 
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elsewhere of P.
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These two possible frame-invariant construals of Analysis 1 have contrasting 
implications for the truth-values of counterfactuals (CC1) and (CC2). To see this, suppose 
first that Analysis 1 is construed as instructing us to hold fixed the whole region of space-time 
outside the absolute future of A's measurement. Since the measurement of B isn't in the 
absolute future of A's measurement, the outcome of the measurement of B (namely B's being 
spin down) is part of what gets held fixed. On this construal of Analysis 1, counterfactual 
(CC1) therefore comes out false. Similarly for (CC2), which comes out false as well. 
Suppose that, by contrast, Analysis 1 is construed as instructing us to hold fixed 
merely the absolute past of A's measurement. Since the measurement of B doesn't lie in the 
absolute past of A's measurement, it isn't part of what gets held fixed, but instead is part of 
what is allowed to lawfully vary under the counterfactual supposition about A's measurement. 
In virtue of the lawful (anti-)correlation between the spins of A and B, B is therefore spin-up 
in such a world. On this construal of Analysis 1, (CC1) therefore comes out true. Similarly for 
(CC2), which comes out true as well. 
In general, if Analysis 1 is construed as instructing us to hold fixed the complement of 
the absolute future of the antecedent-event, then we don't get counterfactual dependence 
between space-like separated events. By contrast, if it is construed as instructing us to hold 
fixed merely the absolute past of the antecedent-event, we get counterfactual dependence (and 
indeed bi-directional counterfactual dependence) between the measurement outcomes on 
entangled but space-like separated particles. 
3.4 Discussion 
In the previous subsections, we have seen that Lewis's Analysis 1 of counterfactuals is 
multiply ambiguous when applied to a relativistic space-time. On one construal (which seems 
to us to be the most natural), the verdicts of Analysis 1 concerning the truth-values of 
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counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2) become relative to a choice of reference-frame. Since 
Analysis 1 doesn't itself supply us with any grounds for making this choice (nor is there any 
obviously correct choice), Analysis 1, on this construal, is ambiguous about whether there is 
counterfactual dependence between our measurement outcomes. 
But the ambiguity doesn't end there, for there is a further question of whether 
Analysis 1 is to be construed in this frame-relative way. There are frame-invariant readings as 
well. If Analysis 1 is to be construed in a frame-invariant way, then there is the still further 
question of which frame-invariant reading it is to be given. We outlined two possibilities: that 
the worlds that Analysis 1 takes to be relevant are those where we hold fixed merely the 
absolute past of the antecedent-event, or those where we hold fixed the complement of its 
absolute future.  
The truth-values of counterfactuals which, like (CC1) and (CC2), concern correlated 
but space-like separated events depend upon the resolution of each of these open questions 
about how to interpret Analysis 1. As it stands, Analysis 1 therefore fails to yield determinate 
truth-values for these counterfactuals. In contrast, when it comes to evaluating everyday 
counterfactuals concerning time-like separated events, Analysis 1 yields the same verdicts no 
matter how these questions are resolved. 
In cases like ours, standard CACs take counterfactual dependence to be both necessary 
and sufficient for causation. Since Analysis 1 fails to yield determinate truth-values for 
counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2), standard CACs that are founded upon Analysis 1 don't 
(pace Skyrms and Butterfield) yield the determinate verdict that the measurement events 
cause one another. Rather, they fail to yield a determinate verdict, thus reproducing the 
indecisiveness of intuition on this matter. 
Indeed, not only do standard CACs that are founded upon Analysis 1 reproduce our 
intuitive indecisiveness about whether the outcomes of the measurement events are causally 
related, it seems that the indecisiveness of the resulting theory reflects an important reason for 
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the indecisiveness of intuition, thus helping to satisfy Lewis's desideratum (quoted in 
Section 2) that the theory 'explain […] why common sense comes out indecisive' (our italics). 
Specifically, standard CACs take only foretracking counterfactuals to be relevant to 
causation, since—at least in ordinary cases—causes precede their effects. Analysis 1 is 
designed to yield the truth of only such foretrackers, and accomplishes this for ordinary cases 
by holding fixed history prior to the time of the putative cause event. But CACs founded upon 
Analysis 1 go indecisive about space-like correlations precisely because the time of the 
putative cause event (of A's being spin up, say) is neither in the absolute past nor in the 
absolute future of the putative effect event (of B's being spin down). It is consequently unclear 
whether the putative effect event is part of what is to be held fixed in evaluating the 
counterfactual (so that (CC1) comes out false), or whether it is to be allowed to vary lawfully 
with variations in the cause event (so that (CC1) comes out true). Different construals of 
Analysis 1 yield different verdicts.  
The lack of a robust temporal priority of putative cause to putative effect—that is, the 
failure of the former to be prior to the latter in all reference-frames—seems to be a principal 
reason why physicists and philosophers typically hesitate to interpret the relationship between 
the outcomes of space-like separated measurements causally (see, e.g., Maudlin [2002], pp. 
154–6).15 CACs founded upon Analysis 1 of counterfactuals thus not only reproduce the 
intuitive indecisiveness about whether the correlated outcomes of space-like separated 
measurement events are causally related, but also go indecisive for the same reason (or at 
least for a principal reason) that intuition goes indecisive. Specifically, they do so for the 
reason that, unlike in paradigm cases of causation, there is no robust temporal asymmetry 
between the measurement outcomes. This suggests that, far from CACs running into trouble 
in the case of correlated outcomes of space-like separated measurement events, their treatment 
of these cases can reasonably be taken as one of their virtues. 
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4 Lewis's Analysis 2 of Counterfactuals ('Closest Worlds') 
We have argued that standard CACs founded upon Lewis's Analysis 1 reproduce intuitive 
indecisiveness about whether the measurement outcomes should be regarded as causing one 
another. Nevertheless, Analysis 1 is in fact merely Lewis's first pass at giving the truth-
conditions for counterfactuals. Lewis ([1979], p. 464) recognizes that it is built for a special 
case: counterfactuals whose antecedents concern localized events, evaluated with respect to 
ordinary, non-backtracking contexts. He consequently advances Analysis 2—his 'closest 
worlds' analysis—as a fully general analysis of counterfactuals. 
Analysis 2. A counterfactual 'If it were that P, then it would be that Q' is (non-
vacuously) true if and only if some (accessible) world where both P and Q are 
true is more similar to our actual world, overall, than is any world where P is 
true but Q is false. (Ibid., p. 465, symbolism modified) 
Lewis suggests that the similarity or closeness relation that combines with Analysis 2 to give 
the truth-conditions that counterfactuals receive in ordinary (non-backtracking) contexts is the 
one that is governed by 'weights or priorities' (1)–(4): 
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations 
of law. 
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple 
violations of law. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of 
particular fact […]. (Ibid., p. 472) 
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Although Analysis 2 is more general than Analysis 1, Lewis claims that, when combined with 
the similarity metric governed by (1)–(4), it yields the same truth-values as Analysis 1 for the 
special case of counterfactuals with antecedents concerning localized events, which include 
those counterfactuals relevant to causation. But, as we shall now see, when we move to the 
relativistic case, the analyses aren't equivalent even in this special case. Unlike Analysis 1, 
Analysis 2 combined with priorities (1)–(4) doesn't make reference to temporal notions at all, 
but only to such things as laws and the size of regions of match. It consequently doesn't fall 
into the same indeterminacy as Analysis 1 if space-time is relativistic. 
What results does Analysis 2 yield when combined with priorities (1)–(4) if space-
time is relativistic? Consider a counterfactual 'If it were that P, then it would be that Q' where 
P is entirely about affairs at a space-time point P.
16
 There are two obvious candidates for the 
closest type of world where P is true, which are similar to those we discussed in connection 
with the frame invariant construals of Analysis 1 in Subsection 3.3. Specifically, one 
candidate type is those worlds, wAP ('AP' for 'Absolute Past'), that exactly match @ in 
particular fact throughout the absolute past of P, but may differ from @ in particular fact in 
the absolute elsewhere of P and in the absolute future of P. The other candidate type is those 
worlds, wAFC ('AFC' for 'Absolute Future Complement'), that exactly match @ in particular 
fact throughout the complement of P's absolute future (though not in P itself), but may differ 
from @ in particular fact in the absolute future of P.
17
 Thus defined, all worlds that are of 
type wAFC are also of type wAP, but not vice versa. (@ is trivially of both types.) Say that a 
world is merely of type wAP iff it is of type wAP without being of type wAFC. 
When comparing, according to (1)–(4), worlds of type wAFC with worlds that are 
merely of type wAP, one thing that counts in favor of the relative closeness of worlds of type 
wAFC to @ is that they exactly match @ throughout a more extensive region of space-time 
than do the worlds that are merely of type wAP. They therefore perform better according to 
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priority (2), and will come out closer than worlds that are merely of type wAP provided that 
achieving this more extensive region of match doesn't require a big, widespread, diverse 
violation of actual law (a 'big miracle'). 
When it comes to counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2), at least a small miracle is 
required to secure exact match throughout the complement of the absolute future of the 
antecedent event. Consider (CC1). A world at which A isn't spin-up, but which exactly 
matches @ in the complement of the absolute future of A's measurement is one at which a 
small miracle occurs to ensure that the space-like separated event of B's being spin down still 
occurs, despite A's not being spin up. Assuming this miracle is all that is required,
18
 it seems 
that the closest worlds at which A isn't spin up, according to (1)–(4), will be of type wAFC and 
not merely of type wAP (cp. Bigaj [2006], pp. 93–6).
19
 Counterfactual (CC1) therefore comes 
out false. The same points apply, mutatis mutandis, to (CC2), which comes out false as well. 
There are, however, cases in which a single small miracle may not be enough to ensure 
exact match throughout the complement of the absolute future of A's measurement. Suppose 
that A had been entangled for spin with several other particles, including B, which are 
measured in space-like separation from A's measurement and from the measurements of one 
another. Then further miracles seem to be needed to break the lawful correlation of A's spin 
with the spins of these other particles.
20
 A large number of such miracles would seem to add 
up to a big miracle. The worlds of type wAFC where A isn't spin up thus involve a big miracle, 
since they match @ with respect to the measurement outcomes of the other particles, which 
occur in the absolute elsewhere of A's being measured spin up. Worlds that are merely of type 
wAP, by contrast, are allowed to differ from @ with respect to the measurement outcomes of 
the other particles. There are thus worlds that are merely of type wAP where the lawful 
correlation between the spins of all the particles is maintained and no extraneous violations of 
law occur. These worlds don't involve any big miracles and therefore appear to be the closest 
worlds where A isn't spin up according to (1)–(4). Analysis 2 consequently implies that the 
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spin value of B counterfactually depends upon that of A. Given the symmetry of the case, 
Analysis 2 also implies that the spin value of A counterfactually depends upon that of B. In 
general, in cases where the closest antecedent-worlds are merely of type wAP, we get 
counterfactual dependence (indeed bi-directional counterfactual dependence) between space-
like separated measurement outcomes on entangled particles. 
If, in the absence of redundancy and chancy connections, counterfactual dependence is 
taken to be necessary and sufficient for causation, the implications for causation are obvious: 
given Analysis 2 and priorities (1)–(4), in a case of simple bi-partite entanglement such as that 
originally described (where the closest antecedent-worlds are of type wAFC), A's being spin-up 
doesn't count as a cause of B's being spin down. On the other hand, in a case of multi-particle 
entanglement (where the closest antecedent-worlds are merely of type wAP), we get causal 
relations—indeed bi-directional causal relations—between the measurement results of A and 
B.  
A CAC founded upon Analysis 2 thus doesn't do justice to our ambivalence about 
whether space-like quantum correlations are causal. On the contrary, it yields definite verdicts 
about such cases. It is interesting to note, however, that the definite verdicts that it yields are 
different from those that Skyrms and Butterfield take CACs to imply. In particular, we have 
argued that, in the two-particle entanglement cases upon which we have mainly been focused, 
the combination of standard CACs with Analysis 2 yields the verdict that that the spin values 
of the two particles are not causally related. So, if Analysis 2 is adopted then, pace Skyrms 
(op. cit.), we don't get 'a rather odd, closed causal chain consisting of two spacelike-separated 
events'. On the other hand, we do get odd bi-directional causal relations in multi-particle 
entanglement cases (which aren't discussed by Skyrms or Butterfield). 
It isn't clear to us that the oddity of such relations is in itself a decisive objection to an 
analysis of causation that implies them.
21
 But it is certainly puzzling that standard CACs 
founded upon Analysis 2 should yield these relations in certain multi-particle entanglement 
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cases, but not in the case where only two particles are entangled. 
Nevertheless, what we find most problematic about the combination of standard CACs 
with Analysis 2 is that the resulting theory yields clear verdicts about causation (including the 
verdict that there is no causation in the two-particle case) where intuition seems unclear. In 
virtue of their remoteness from ordinary experience, we might take these to be 'spoils to the 
victor' cases, about which theory may say what it likes. But certainly this is less satisfactory 
than having our theory reproduce our intuitive indecisiveness. In the previous section we 
argued that the combination of Analysis 1 with standard CACs does precisely this, and that 
the indecisiveness of the resulting theory is connected to a principal reason for our intuitive 
indecisiveness: that there fails to be a robust temporal asymmetry between putative cause and 
effect. This seems to be a strong point in favor of the combination of standard CACs with 
Analysis 1. We therefore take that combination to be superior to the combination of standard 
CACs with Analysis 2. 
It might be argued that the combination of standard CACs with Analysis 2 sometimes 
does yield indeterminate results concerning space-like correlations. After all, the 
individuation conditions for miracles, and the number of small miracles required to constitute 
a big miracle, seem vague matters (see Woodward [2003], pp. 138–9). There may thus be 
cases—perhaps involving intermediate numbers of entangled particles—where it's 
indeterminate whether the closest antecedent-worlds for counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2) 
are of type wAFC or merely of type wAP, resulting in a corresponding indeterminacy about the 
truth values of these counterfactuals and hence about whether there is causation between the 
spin-values of the entangled particles. 
Our response is threefold. First, in extreme cases such as that involving just two 
entangled particles, the implications of Analysis 2 seem clear, even though intuition is 
indecisive about these cases too. Analysis 1, by contrast, is indecisive even about the two-
particle case. Second, and relatedly, the reason why Analysis 2 goes indeterminate in cases 
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involving intermediate numbers of entangled particles doesn't seem to have anything to do 
with the reason why our intuitions are indeterminate. It hardly seems that we are indecisive 
about whether to interpret space-like correlations causally because we are unsure whether it 
would take a large or a small miracle to alter the spin-value of one particle while holding 
fixed those of the particles with which it is entangled.
22
 By contrast, as already noted, the 
reason Analysis 1 goes indecisive appears to be the same as a principal reason for which 
intuition goes indecisive (namely, the lack of a robust time-order). Third, and again relatedly, 
the vagueness of the distinction between big and small miracles, and hence the liability of 
Analysis 2 to go indecisive, has nothing particularly to do with space-like correlations in 
quantum mechanics. Analysis 2 is also liable to go indecisive for this reason in certain 
everyday cases involving time-like related macroscopic events where intuition delivers clear 
causal verdicts (see Woodward op. cit.). This provides an independent reason for preferring 
Analysis 1 to Analysis 2.
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5 Extending the Everyday Concept of Cause 
Our concept of causation was shaped through experience of interactions between macroscopic 
events, where correlations can typically be explained in terms of causal relations between 
events that stand in time-like relations to one another. It should therefore come as no great 
surprise that intuition goes indecisive about whether the correlated spin properties of space-
like separated particles cause one another. We have argued that the combination of standard 
CACs with Lewis's Analysis 1 does a good job of reproducing this indecision. 
There is, however, a further question about the moral to be drawn from the 
indecisiveness of intuitions about such cases. Should we conclude that the concept of 
causation is simply not apt to fundamental physics, and that it ought to be dispelled from the 
inventory of concepts that the physicist draws upon in constructing her theories (though 
perhaps not from the conceptual inventory of the special sciences or of folk theory)?
24
 Or 
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should we maintain that the concept of causation has an important role to play in physics, but 
conclude that it must be revised and extended in the light of that physics? If the latter 
conclusion is drawn, the idea would be that we should seek to forge a revised concept of 
cause appropriate to what we now know about (for instance) the structure of space-time. 
While we won't seek a definitive answer to these questions, it is worth noting that 
someone pursuing a revisionary (or 'prescriptive') CAC might achieve determinate results 
about space-like correlations by adopting one of the various precisifications of Analysis 1 that 
were discussed in Section 3.
25
 Analysis 1 yields indeterminate results about counterfactuals 
like (CC1) and (CC2) because it specifies that the relevant worlds are 'exactly like our actual 
world at all times before P'. We saw that, in the context of a relativistic space-time, phrases 
like this are ambiguous. They might be construed as having any one of several precise 
meanings. In particular, that the relevant worlds are 'exactly like our actual world at all times 
before P' might be read as instructing us to hold fixed the absolute past of P, to hold fixed the 
complement of the absolute future of P, or to hold fixed the past of P in a given frame of 
reference. 
Combining a standard CAC with the stipulation that the correct worlds to consider in 
evaluating the relevant counterfactuals are those where we hold fixed the complement of the 
absolute future of the antecedent-event might be regarded as the most conservative extension 
of standard CACs to a relativistic space-time. It implies that our ambivalence about what to 
say about space-like correlations should be resolved in such a way that we don't admit them as 
causal. According to this option only pairs of events whose time-ordering is robust (as is the 
case for events that we regard as causes and effects in everyday life) are candidates for 
standing in a cause-effect relation. 
Combining a standard CAC with the alternative stipulation that the correct worlds to 
consider in evaluating our counterfactuals are those where we hold fixed merely the absolute 
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past of the antecedent-event might be regarded as a more radical option. In particular, as we 
have seen, this would be liable to generate bi-directional causal relations between the 
outcomes of our measurement events. Following Skyrms, one might take these bi-directional 
causal relations to be 'odd'. For our part, we don't regard the consequence of bi-directional 
causation to be a decisive objection against this strategy of holding fixed only the absolute 
past of the antecedent event. It is true that bi-directional causation isn't part of our everyday 
experience. But we are here concerned with possible extensions of the ordinary concept of 
cause to cases of quantum entanglement, which are quite foreign to ordinary experience.
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There is, however, a more interesting option for extending our ordinary notion of 
cause to space-like correlations in a relativistic space-time. In Subsection 3.2, we observed 
that the most natural reading of the phrases 'all times before P' and 'all times after P' that 
appear in Analysis 1 interprets these phrases as meaning 'all times before (after) P relative to 
a given frame of reference'. On this construal, different choices of frames will lead Analysis 1 
to yield different verdicts about counterfactual dependence between our measurement 
outcomes.  
Suppose that we adopt this frame-relative construal of Analysis 1. There are then three 
natural options for extending standard CACs so that they yield definite verdicts about 
causation between our correlated but space-like separated measurement outcomes (which are 
subject to the usual qualification that the case doesn't involve redundancy or merely 
probabilistic connections): 
(I) Counterfactual dependence in some frame is necessary and sufficient 
for causation. 
(II) Counterfactual dependence in all frames is necessary and sufficient for 
causation. 
(III) Causation is frame-relative. Counterfactual dependence in a frame is 
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necessary and sufficient for causation in that frame. 
The frame-relative construal of Analysis 1 combined with option (I) yields just the 
same results as the combination of standard CACs with the frame-invariant construal of 
Analysis 1 that stipulates the relevance of those worlds where we hold fixed merely the 
absolute past of the antecedent-event. That is, it gives us bi-directional causation between the 
spin-values of A and B. 
The frame-relative construal of Analysis 1 combined with option (II) yields just the 
same results as the combination of standard CACs with the frame-invariant construal of 
Analysis 1 that stipulates the relevance of those worlds where we hold fixed the complement 
of the absolute future of the antecedent-event. That is, it gives us no causation between the 
spin-values of A and B (and indeed rules out causation between space-like separated events 
entirely). 
The interestingly novel possibility is to combine the frame-relative construal of 
Analysis 1 with option (III). The resulting theory gives us not only frame-relative 
counterfactual dependence but also frame-relative causation between our measurement 
outcomes. Consider the three frames introduced in Subsection 3.2. The present theory implies 
that, in Frame 3, A's being spin up causes B's being spin down, but not vice versa; that, in 
Frame 2, B's being spin down causes A's being spin up, but not vice versa; and that, in Frame 
1, there is bi-directional causation between A's being spin up and B's being spin down. One 
might find this option attractive if one thinks that the causal and temporal orders are tightly 
connected but also wants to do justice to the insights of relativity concerning the reversibility 
of the measurements' time-order. 
Ultimately, however, our aim in this section has simply been to outline some possible 
alternatives for a counterfactual analyst of causation who wishes to extend the ordinary 
concept of causation so that it delivers determinate results about correlated events of space-
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like separation. A detailed evaluation of these various options must await another occasion. 
6 Conclusion 
We have examined the implications that standard CACs have concerning the space-like 
correlations of quantum mechanics when combined with Lewis's Analysis 1 and his Analysis 
2 of counterfactuals. When combined with Analysis 1, standard CACs are indecisive about 
these cases, reproducing the intuitive indecision that many philosophers and physicists have 
felt about them. Indeed the reason that standard CACs go indecisive when combined with 
Analysis 1 corresponds to an important reason for our intuitive indecision, namely the fact 
that the measurement outcomes lack the sort of robust temporal asymmetry that is 
characteristic of paradigm cases of causation. This is a point in favor of the combination of 
standard CACs with Analysis 1. 
That this combination reproduces our intuitive indecisiveness and does so for the right 
reasons is particularly notable given that it has previously been suggested (notably by Skyrms 
and Butterfield) that standard CACs run into trouble with space-like correlations, yielding 
firm verdicts of causation, despite the intuitive 'oddity' of these alleged causal relations. We 
have argued that, when standard CACs are combined with Analysis 1 of counterfactuals, this 
isn't so.  
The combination of standard CACs with Lewis's Analysis 2 doesn't have the desirable 
property of reproducing the intuitive indecisiveness about space-like correlations (a fortiori it 
doesn't do so on the grounds for which intuition goes indecisive). On the contrary, in at least 
many such cases, it yields firm verdicts about causation. Interestingly, the firm verdict 
reached concerning the measurement outcomes on a pair of particles prepared in the spin 
singlet (viz., the verdict that there is no causation between their spin values) is the reverse of 
the verdict that Skyrms and Butterfield assume.  
Finally, while the combination of standard CACs with Analysis 1 appears to fare well 
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as a descriptive theory of causation (that is, it does well at capturing our intuitions about 
causation), there is the further question of whether we might seek to extend the everyday 
concept of causation to yield definite results about space-like correlations. Definite results can 
be achieved by combining an appropriate CAC with one of the precisifications of Analysis 1 
surveyed in Section 3. We have remained neutral on which, if any, precisification (and choice 
of CAC) should be favored and on what the role of the concept of causation in physical theory 
should be.  
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1
 See (Butterfield [1989], [1992b], [2007]; Hofer-Szabó [2011]) and references therein. The 
special case in which the particles are measured for spin along the same axis is in fact one to 
which hidden variable models positing a local common causal explanation are predictively 
adequate. Local hidden variable models don't, however, accurately predict the empirically 
observed correlations that arise where such particle pairs are measured for spin along different 
axes. It would be ad hoc to posit local hidden variables in the one sort of case, but not the 
other. 
2
 Recent accounts in this tradition can be found in (Collins et al. [2004]). 
3
 Hall ([2004]) distinguishes two 'kinds' or 'concepts' of causation, but argues that 
counterfactual dependence suffices for one kind. 
4
 It is somewhat controversial to take, as Lewis (ibid.) does, (†) 'If it were that X, then the 
chance of Y would have been zero' as in general implying (‡) 'If it were that X, then Y 
wouldn't have occurred'. But the specific inference from 'If A hadn't been spin up, then the 
chance of B's being spin down would have been zero' to (CC1) is plausible, since chance zero 
attaches to the particles having the same spin along the same axis in virtue of this outcome's 
nomic impossibility, and not because it is one of infinitely many possible outcomes. 
5
 Strictly speaking, Lewis doesn't take mere probabilistic dependence to be sufficient for 
causation, but only what we might call strong probabilistic dependence: without the putative 
cause the probability of the effect would have been much less (i.e., less by a large factor) than 
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it actually was (ibid., pp. 176–7). Butterfield ([1992a], pp. 32–4) argues that this restriction 
shouldn't be regarded as saving Lewis's CAC from delivering problematic results concerning 
space-like correlations. It is worth noting that the claim that (strong) probabilistic dependence 
suffices for causation is more controversial than the corresponding claim about counterfactual 
dependence. For a survey of alleged examples of probabilistic dependence in the absence of 
causation, see (Hitchcock [2004]). 
6
 At least this seems to be the reaction of common sense once a common-cause explanation is 
ruled out (as it is for reasons given in Section 1).  
7
 Maudlin ([2002], Ch. 5) holds that counterfactuals like (CC1) and (CC2) are true of the sort 
of experiment we have described, but he doesn't attempt to discriminate back- and back-then-
foretrackers from ordinary foretrackers (ibid., pp. 129, 129n). He consequently takes 
counterfactual dependence (of any of these stripes) to be sufficient not for causation, but for 
mere 'causal implication'. 
8
 We present a version of Analysis 1 that is simplified in respects irrelevant to the discussion 
at hand. 
9
 Finkelstein ([1999], pp. 290–1) briefly considers, but dismisses, a frame-relative 
interpretation of counterfactuals.  
10
 In arguing that Lewis's CAC commits him to causation between the measurement 
outcomes, Butterfield ([1992a], esp. pp. 34–41, cp. [1992b], p. 51) assumes a fixed frame of 
reference, and doesn't discuss the implications that relativistic space-time has for the truth of 
the relevant counterfactuals. Neither does Skyrms (op. cit.). 
11
 An alternative way is to have Detector 1 fail to register a reading. In that case, Analysis 1 
still yields the truth of (CC1*) which, on Lewis's view, suffices for (probabilistic) causation. 
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12
 We assume that 'minimal difference' means minimizing violations of law even at the cost of 
sacrificing some minor match of particular fact. In the present example, this means keeping 
the lawful (anti-)correlation at the cost of sacrificing B's being spin down. 
13
 Mutatis mutandis, the following distinctions could still be made if this assumption were 
dropped. If P were allowed to be a non-point-sized region of space-time then, in what 
follows, the phrases 'the absolute past of P' and 'the absolute future of P' should be replaced, 
respectively, by the phrases 'the union of all those points outside of P that are in the absolute 
past of at least one point in P' and 'the union of all those points outside of P that are in the 
absolute future of at least one point in P' (cp. Finkelstein [1999], p. 291). 
14
 On these two options, compare (Bigaj [2004], [2006], pp. 185–90) and (Finkelstein [1999]). 
Other frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 are possible. For instance, one might read it so 
that it requires us to hold fixed what lies to the past of a given Cauchy surface cross-cutting 
P's absolute past close to P (cp. Maudlin [2007], pp. 22–23; cp. also Stapp [2001]). The 
existence of further frame-invariant readings only strengthens our later diagnosis that 
Analysis 1 is ambiguous under relativity. For further discussion of temporal notions in 
relativity, see (Stein [1991]).  
15
 It isn't the only reason. Another, related reason, is the relativistic prohibition upon a causal 
process connecting the measurement outcomes. Since standard CACs don't make the 
existence of a connecting process necessary for causation, the absence of such a process 
doesn't in itself prevent CACs from implying that the measurement outcomes are causally 
related. On the other hand, theories of causation that do take a connecting causal process to be 
necessary (e.g., Salmon [1984], [1994], [1997]; Dowe [2000]) straightforwardly imply that 
the case is not one of causation. Consequently, they can't do justice to our apparent 
ambivalence about such cases. 
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16
 As was the case with the frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 that we discussed in 
Subsection 3.3, the following remarks can be generalized to space-time regions that aren't 
point-sized; cp. footnote 13. 
17
 It was noted in footnote 14 that Finkelstein ([1999]) and Bigaj ([2004], [2006], Ch. 5) 
discuss the comparative merits of a pair of truth-conditions for counterfactuals that are closely 
related to the frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1. Those truth-conditions are also closely 
related to the wAP and wAFC approaches. Finkelstein and Bigaj don't seek to derive these truth-
conditions from Lewis's priorities (1)–(4), however. Indeed, the context of their discussion 
differs from that of ours since, unlike Lewis, they disallow nomologically impossible worlds 
and hence disallow worlds involving violations of law (see Finkelstein [1999], pp. 289, 293–
4; Bigaj [2004], pp. 7–8, [2006], pp. 97–101). The same restriction is in play in the debate 
about Stapp's ([1997]) proof; see especially (Shimony and Stein [2003], p. 501). 
18
 Note that there is no need for an additional miracle to ensure that A isn't measured spin up 
in the first place. Since A had a chance of ½ of being measured spin down, the non-occurrence 
of its being spin up can be brought about without a miracle by simply having it be measured 
spin down. 
19
 For ease of exposition, we assume that phrases of the form 'the closest worlds where such-
and-such is the case' are well-defined, which requires the so-called Limit Assumption to hold 
(see Lewis [1973b], pp. 19–21). Nothing hinges on this, however. 
20
 The state (|…> + |…>)/2 for n particles yields an example of such a case. 
Suppose that an appropriate measurement is conducted on one of the particles, which in fact is 
spin up. Then, at a world at which this particle is instead measured spin down, it appears that 
n – 1 miracles are needed to hold fixed the remaining n – 1 particles in their original spin up 
state (cp. Lewis [1986a], p. 56).  
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21
 Bi-directional causal relations will be discussed further in the next section. 
22
 Nor does our indecision seem to have anything to do with a possible epistemic uncertainty 
about how many particles are entangled, and consequently how many small miracles would 
be required. 
23
 The question of whether Analysis 1 can be derived from a fully general semantics that is 
adequate to the ordinary language counterfactual (as Lewis claims Analysis 2 is) isn't one that 
need concern us. Even if Analysis 1 bears only a loose connection to the semantics 
appropriate to the ordinary language counterfactual, this doesn't tell against CACs that appeal 
to it. As Collins et al. point out concerning this issue, '[t]he counterfactual analyst should not 
worry: After all, she is doing the metaphysics of causation, and not the semantics of some 
fragment of English' ([2004], p. 9). 
24
 Russell ([1913]) famously argued for an affirmative answer to this question. For recent 
discussion, see the papers collected in (Price and Corry [2007]). 
25
 One could alternatively try to build a revisionary theory of causation on Analysis 2. This 
approach doesn't seem very promising, however. As we saw in Section 4, Analysis 2 yields 
definite causal verdicts when combined with standard CACs, but those verdicts depend upon 
how many particles are entangled, and it seems doubtful that a theory's causal verdicts ought 
to depend upon this.  
26
 It is possible to forestall a possible objection to bi-directional causation voiced by Kistler 
([2006], pp. 48–9). Suppose that events e1 and e2 cause each other, and that causation is 
transitive: if e1 causes e2 and e2 causes e3, then e1 causes e3. Then e1 causes itself (assume e1 = 
e3), which may seem an unacceptable result. In response, we suggest that at most the 
following restricted transitivity principle, which is similar in spirit to the standard requirement 
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that cause and effect be distinct events, is true: if e1 causes e2, e2 causes e3, and e1, e2, and e3 
are pairwise distinct events, then e1 causes e3. This principle, together with the claim that 
there is bi-directional causation between our measurement outcomes, doesn't imply that each 
measurement outcome is a cause of itself. 
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